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The past two years have been challenging for European 
security and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
Russia’s behaviour on the international scene changed the 
nature of the debate about the future of European relations 
with Moscow.  At the same time, a new and dangerous threat 
known as the Islamic State arose in the deserts south of 
NATO, leading to the return of terrorist attacks on major cities 
in the West and a dramatic surge of refugees from the Middle 
East to Europe. This presents a another long-term challenge 
to Europe.
This paper describes two aspects of the changed security 
environment. First, it discusses NATO’s response to the new 
threats on its eastern and southern borders. The Alliance 
took a number of modest steps at the Wales Summit in Sep-
tember 2014 to deal with those, but were they enough? Will 
it announce a more robust response at the Warsaw Summit 
this summer? 
Second, what is the role for NATO nuclear policy in strategic 
deterrence? Why is this topic back in discussion after years of 
benign neglect within the Alliance? Given its sensitivity, this 
subject is unlikely to be discussed at the next summit—but 
perhaps it should be. This paper addresses some of the key 
elements of deterrence strategy in an alliance that has not 
had to think about the subject for more than two decades.
NATO’s Adaptation to the New Threat Environment
Russia
Moscow today has a 19th century balance of power view of 
the world.1 That includes the belief that great powers should 
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be accorded spheres of influence in which they can deter-
mine how neighbouring states behave. Russia has repeatedly 
stated its opposition to NATO enlargement, arguing that this 
moves the Alliance eastward into Moscow’s supposed sphere 
of influence. This reflects several aspects of Russian politi-
cal culture: its fear of the West; concern over conventional 
inferiority in terms of military forces; and unwillingness to 
accept Western norms or values as equivalent to Russian val-
ues. These attitudes, when expressed by a country that most 
analysts consider to be at least nominally European, can be 
seen as a combination of xenophobia, paranoia, and cultural 
exclusivity. Combined with a preference for strong autocratic 
leadership rather than democracy and a rules-based system, 
some Russians claim that theirs is a different civilization 
than that espoused by the West.
What drives Russian foreign policy under President Putin? Is 
it genuine fear of the West and a quest for security? Or is it 
opportunism, wherein Moscow sees a weakness and moves 
to exploit it, without consideration of the consequences for 
international stability? The answer one gives to this question 
has major policy implications for NATO. If Putin genuinely 
fears the West, then NATO should avoid strong military 
actions that would exacerbate that fear and which could lead 
to an action-reaction arms race, or that could cause a crisis to 
spiral out of control. Rather, the Alliance should emphasize 
dialogue, soft power, and regular discourse to assure Mos-
cow that the West’s intentions are benevolent. 
On the other hand, if Putin and his cohort are opportunistic, 
then the Alliance must respond with military force to show 
that it will not allow such behaviour, to reinforce the knowl-
edge that NATO is a cohesive military alliance that cannot 
be intimidated. This dilemma explains much of the reason 
1 An overview of Russia and its internal dynamics can be found in Nicholas 
Burns and Jonathon Price, editors, The Crisis with Russia (Washington: The 
Aspen Institute, 2014). 
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for NATO’s slow and modest response to Moscow’s belliger-
ence: because it simply does not know which type of Russia 
it is dealing with. This problem is exacerbated by the loss of 
expertise in understanding Russia among academics, intel-
lectuals, and policy makers over the past 25 years. 
NATO’s Response 
The events of 2014 forced the Alliance to reconsider its 15 
year emphasis on out of area expeditionary operations and 
its focus on the crisis management and cooperative security 
pillars of the 2010 Strategic Concept at the expense of the 
core responsibility of collective defense.2 Thanks to the rise 
of surprising new threats on two flanks, the allies find them-
selves having to reassess the importance and centrality of 
collective defense and deterrence.  
NATO’s initial reaction to the events of 2014 was modest. 
Russian foreign policy behaviour in Crimea, in Ukraine, 
and in public statements attacking the Alliance, came as a 
shock to most member states. NATO had grown to think of 
Russia as a strategic partner, not an adversary. Obviously the 
hoped-for post-Afghanistan “peace dividend” was no longer 
going to happen.  Instead, with Russian behaviour in the East 
and the rise of a new threat to the South, it was necessary 
for the Alliance to respond in some way. It could not sit still. 
The threat had returned, and most Alliance members were 
not immediately prepared to deal with it, either militarily or 
psychologically. 
The most difficult concept to come to grips with was that 
there was now a clear, growing, and dangerous military 
imbalance in Eastern Europe that could potentially be 
exploited by Moscow. This had to be addressed, and much 
of the Wales Summit declaration did just that.3 Neverthe-
less, NATO policy toward Russia in the first two years after 
Crimea has been relatively cautious: modest conventional 
force enhancements in the region, cessation of all practical 
cooperation with Russia, economic sanctions imposed by 
the European Union and the United States, and so on. The 
debate within the Alliance had been whether to emphasize 
defense or dialogue. Yet over the past two years the return of 
Russia as an existential threat against Alliance interests has 
become obvious to all members. 
That said, not all members agree on the degree of the threat 
from the East. Some member states look first to the South for 
threats, and would prefer to see either multiple strategies that 
address each flank, or a single strategy that balances NATO’s 
response to threats coming from any direction. This debate 
threatens the cohesion of the Alliance, risking the creation 
of a fissure between four groupings of states: those with bor-
ders shared with Russia, who fear any appearance of weak-
ness; those who are more concerned with Mediterranean 
issues such as migration, maritime security, and ungoverned 
spaces in North Africa and the Middle East, those who prefer 
to see a balanced approach with a 360 degree threat assess-
ment; and those that are not sure which approach is best. 
At the Wales Summit in September 2014 the Alliance devel-
oped a number of initiatives that were meant to serve as a 
conventional counter to Russian threats to the eastern flank of 
the Alliance. These all made the Alliance stronger, providing 
some measure of reassurance to NATO allies in the East, and 
presumably some measure of deterrence to Russia’s military. 
Some were short term fixes, others will require longer-term 
adaptation.  Nearly all were focused on the Eastern flank. As 
a result, criticism arose that the Alliance was ignoring the 
growing threat from the South, and that it had no policies 
for dealing with two immediate threats: illegal migration and 
terrorism. Both of these may be addressed in Warsaw.
Officially NATO is “adapting” to the new world. The issues in 
this adaptation can be placed in three categories: military, 
political, and institutional. In the political basket, of course 
Russia dominates current thinking. Policy areas demanding 
adaptation include crisis management; NATO’s partnership 
policy; enlargement and the Open Door policy; the Defense 
Capacity Building initiative; support to Ukraine; NATO’s 
future role in Afghanistan; and the Interoperability Initiative 
with partners. There is also discussion brewing over whether 
to revise NATO’s current Strategic Concept, approved in Lis-
bon in 2010. 
Military issues center around implementation of the Readi-
ness Action Plan, including all its various elements: the 
Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, the expanded and 
rejuvenated NATO Response Force, the creation of multiple 
new regional headquarters; enhanced exercising; and the 
pre-positioning of equipment in threatened regions. Equally 
important is the issue of hybrid warfare and how to respond 
to threats on the lower end of the conflict spectrum – for 
instance, economic measures and strategic communication 
campaigns. Other military programs and plans under review, 
possibly in line for enhanced emphasis, include missile 
defense, cyber defense, joint intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance, and nuclear deterrence. 
Institutional issues are key to the success of all political and 
military initiatives. These include ongoing NATO reform 
measures, including a possible reorganization of the Alli-
ance’s operational structure; budgeting and the Defense 
Investment Pledge; and relations with the European Union. 
To achieve its security goals, NATO needs to maintain or 
enhance its relationship with other multinational organi-
zations, including the European Union, United Nations, 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Afri-
can Union, Gulf Cooperation Council, and Arab League.
2 “Strategic Engagement, Active Defense: 2010 Strategic Concept,” 19 No-
vember 2010, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_82705.htm 
3 “Wales Summit Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government 
participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales,” NATO 
Press Release (2014)120, 5 September 2014, para. 22, at http://www.
nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm.
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The Warsaw Summit
Most of the initiatives listed above will be recognized at 
the Warsaw Summit as either successfully implemented 
or nearing completion. Likely agenda items at the Summit 
include:
• Wales Summit initiatives. An assessment of their imple-
mentation and effectiveness.
• Russia. How shall NATO attempt to deal with Moscow? 
Should it restore more normalized relations, including 
exchanges and regular dialogue? 
• Ukraine. Can or should the Alliance do more to support 
this partner state?
• Islamic State. What is NATO’s role, if any, in fighting the 
Islamic state? 
• Hybrid warfare. A new NATO strategy on hybrid threats 
provides guidance when dealing with such challenges 
lower on the conflict spectrum.
• Collective defense. What additional military responses 
will the Alliance take in the Baltic States to ensure their 
protection and assure them of that commitment? 
• Deterrence. Will the Alliance make take a public stance 
on the continued importance of nuclear weapons as one 
of the foundations for its security?
• Enlargement. Montenegro will join the Alliance this 
year. Will NATO continue its Open Door policy to further 
membership? 
• Partnerships. How can the Alliance maintain the lessons 
learned from cooperative operations in Afghanistan? 
• Migration. NATO does not have an official role to play 
in this area, but public demands for controls against 
embedded terrorists may lead to a reconsideration of its 
hands-off policy. 
• Counterterrorism. The Alliance may find itself under 
pressure to enhance or expand its counterterrorism 
policy. 
• Alliance cohesion. The Alliance must ensure that it 
remains a military alliance of “all for one and one for all” 
by avoiding potential rifts in the consensus over what 
threats it faces, which of those are most important, and 
how to respond in a balanced and appropriate manner. 
At Warsaw the Alliance must reinforce its credibility as a 
strong, formidable military machine in the eyes of its allies, 
partners, and antagonists. At the same time it must remem-
ber that it is also a political organization with responsibili-
ties derived from the Washington Treaty that range beyond 
simply military defense. 
Nuclear Deterrence
As a result of Moscow’s nuclear sabre-rattling during its 
exercises over the past two years, the Alliance finds itself 
focusing not only on the conventional aspects of collective 
defense and deterrence, but on its nuclear dimensions as 
well. The Alliance continues to assert that deterrence rests 
on an appropriate mix of conventional, nuclear, and mis-
sile defense forces, and that “as long as nuclear weapons 
exist, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance.”4 This requires 
a robust, well-trained, modern, and reliable nuclear 
force. The 2012 NATO Deterrence and Defense Posture 
Review (DDPR) stated that NATO’s current nuclear sharing 
arrangements, which include risk- and responsibility shar-
ing across as many member states as possible, remains the 
best option for the Alliance. That assessment, however, was 
made before the current troubles with Russia, so some are 
arguing that the DDPR needs to be reconsidered in light of 
these changing circumstances. Some analysts have called 
for modernization of NATO’s modest nuclear force of US 
tactical nuclear warheads forward deployed in Europe, 
plus the fleet of dual-capable aircraft operated by European 
member states. 
NATO’s nuclear policy, based largely on an extended deter-
rence commitment provided by the United States, has 
protected member states from attack since 1949. Nuclear 
weapons today are called “political weapons,” whose 
purpose is to deter aggression against the Alliance and pro-
vide an ultimate security insurance policy. There are three 
nuclear weapons states within NATO, and all NATO mem-
bers (except France) participate in the Nuclear Planning 
Group at NATO Headquarters. But the nuclear deterrent has 
faced reduced interest and attention since about 1990. The 
end of the Cold War, the disappearance of the adversary 
(at least temporarily), the rise of expeditionary out-of-area 
operations, the reorganization and reduction of force plan-
ning offices at various headquarters, and the general loss 
of expertise in nuclear matters all led to the neglect of this 
leg of NATO’s security apparatus. Today the Alliance has no 
official adversary, no pre-designated targets, no plans on 
the shelf for contingencies that involve nuclear weapons. 
Officially, it states that “the circumstances in which any 
use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are 
extremely remote.”5  
That said, the importance of nuclear deterrent forces has 
been made apparent through Russian behaviour the past 
two years, leading to renewed interest in the subject by 
military and civilian leaders. But to what extent should the 
Alliance emphasize its nuclear deterrent in the face of Rus-
sian behaviour? There is a difference of opinion within the 
Alliance over whether to downplay or highlight the nuclear 
aspects of NATO forces. 
At the moment Alliance policy is clear: the ultimate secu-
rity of NATO rests on an appropriate mix of conventional, 
nuclear, and missile defense forces. The rationale for 
retaining these capabilities has changed in recent years, 
but it is still cogent. Nuclear weapons serve as a deterrent 
against existential threats, such as those posed by Russia. 
They serve as an indispensable link between North America 
4 ”Deterrence and Defense Posture Review,” NATO Press Release (2012) 
063, 20 May 2012, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_
texts_87597.htm. 
5 Wales Summit Declaration, para. 50.
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and Europe, coupling the two continents in a single secu-
rity arrangement. Their existence discourages possible 
proliferation by allies that might otherwise pursue their 
own nuclear capabilities. The provide assurance to allies, 
particularly those feeling most exposed or threatened by a 
potential adversary.  They prevent feelings of abandonment 
or vulnerability among allies. They create uncertainty in the 
mind of potential adversaries. They can serve as potential 
bargaining chips in future arms control negotiations with 
Russia. Keeping them in Europe can reduce the political 
strains that would occur if they were to be removed. All of 
these reasons are in line with those that the United States 
considered when it drafted the 2010 Nuclear Posture 
Review,  which stated that the United States would con-
tinue to provide extended deterrence to its allies in Europe 
(and Asia) using forward-deployable tactical and strategic 
aircraft.6 This was part of the justification for a nuclear vari-
ant of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter currently in production. 
President Obama has called for “maintaining military capa-
bilities to deny the objectives of, or impose unacceptable 
costs on, any aggressor.”7 Since the 1940s such language 
has been code for nuclear deterrence. 
Conclusion 
The long term adaptation of the Alliance to the new security 
environment will require steps that will harken back to the 
days of the Cold War. Some allies may be uncomfortable 
with those decisions. But as a military alliance charged with 
defending its member nations against adversary threats to 
Europe and North America, it is incumbent upon the Allies 
to act to meet that responsibility. The world is unlikely to see 
a quick return to the comfortable way things were just a few 
years ago. Accepting this reality will have consequences for 
the Alliance. For example, this may mean increasing its mili-
tary presence in those parts of the periphery of the Alliance 
most threatened, perhaps with permanently stationed com-
bat forces in those regions. It may require NATO to strengthen 
its force structure, including ground forces, airpower, and 
other long range strike capabilities, with a credible nuclear 
deterrent as a backstop. It may require improvements to 
existing command structures. And it will most certainly 
be expensive, requiring all member states to abide by their 
defense investment pledge. 
NATO remains the ultimate guarantor of European security. 
The Alliance today is once again placing increased emphasis 
on its core mission of collective defense. As a political and 
military alliance charged with defending its member states’ 
territory, people, and vital interests, this is NATO’s primary 
mission. All other missions added since the end of the Cold 
War are secondary to this. At the Warsaw Summit in July 
2016 the Alliance members may choose to remind the world, 
including potential adversaries and their own publics, of this 
responsibility. 
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